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LEGAL INTERPRETATION AND THE
POWER OF THE JUDICIARY
FRANK

H.

EASTERBROOK*

Judges interpret words. And words do not bind the interpreters;
rather the interpreters give meaning to the words. The meaning of
words is not the same as the "intent" of the writers. Often writers
have no pertinent intent or have several intents. When they have
an intent it does not control, because words are mere instruments
for conveying thoughts to others. The critical people are the users,
not the writers, of words.
Words have meaning only to the extent there is some agreement
among a community of users of language. Unless both writers and
readers understand the same thing by some construction of words,
the writing either fails of any purpose or, as with literary interpretation, liberates the reader to supply his own meaning or story.
This creates a fundamental problem for understanding the appropriate roles of courts, because courts are users of words yet are not
supposed to possess much, if any, power to create legal rules.
Many times written words give rise to shared interpretations.
When they do, there is no great problem for judges. Indeed, when
words are clear, there is not even likely to be litigation. People do
not routinely spend time and money trying to persuade judges that
words mean something that all fair-minded readers will conclude
they do not mean. The real problem with statutes and constitutions is that in every interestingcase - every case in which skilled
users and readers of words can reach contrary conclusions from
the text - there is no community of understanding among writers
and readers of words, no meeting of minds. I return to this in Part
II.

I.

THE PROBLEM OF DECISION

Interpretation of words is hard even when they were written by a
single person who could dictate the outcome of the product, rather
than by a collectivity with many minds and desires that tug in different directions and leave a product bearing traces of the struggle.
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. This essay makes use of ideas that have ap-

peared elsewhere. See Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1983);
Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. Or. Rav. 85, 90-94; Easterbrook,
Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. Rv. 802 (1982).
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Interpretation is hard even when the writer had years to focus
energies on a single document. The problems that arise in the interpretation of simple writings are bound to be multiplied by the legislative process. Consider these obstacles:
1. Legislatures lack time to resolve every problem. Usually their
understanding is shallow. Even when it is not, new cases arise that
they did not or could not have foreseen. Yet lack of foresight does
not authorize the reader to supply what the writer omitted, because in the legislative process lack of time is a vital constraint.
Lack of time is why one legislature does not try to do everything,
why the 73d Congress did not answer every problem we face today. (Who would want such a thing, anyway?)
Lack of time is connected to the separation of powers. What the
legislature did not solve, the executive did not address. What was
not presented for veto is no law. If all members of the last Congress reassembled next week and agreed to a few bills, saying that
they lacked time to get around to them in 1981-82, a court would
ignore their rump session. Is there greater warrant for treating
empty statutes as vessels into which judges pour what they think
such a rump session (and a "rump President?") would have done
had they thought of the problem now facing the court?
2. We do not necessarily get a more certain meaning when
something was present in the minds of the drafters. Bodies with
many members have no common meaning. Each member may
have his own meaning. Each one is difficult to discover. Collectively, the meanings may be opaque, contradictory, or both.
3. Often the most acute awareness of a problem leads to the
least resolution of it. It is well known that collective bodies do not
answer the problems that vex them most deeply. Divisions of opinion take time to resolve, and time is not free. Proposals stall, and
the bodies move on to other things. There are other procedural
hurdles, such as unpopular riders and filibusters, that prevent
translation of majority will into law. Thus even if judges knew the
will of a majority of the members of a group, they could not
routinely treat that will as law without disregarding other important parts of the deliberative system.
4. Most laws are compromises. Sometimes the essence of a
compromise is to do nothing, to leave the issue for the future. A
compromise is harder to strike if those working on it believe that it
will be altered by outsiders without the striking of a new bargain,
without a new give and take. Efforts to fill in gaps in language may
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unsettle what was decided and prevent new compromises from
arising.
5. One need not confine attention to compromises among
selfish interests to see the problems of line drawing. When Congress acts in the "pure public interest" (whatever that may be), it
may try to exhaust the available gains from legislation. Take the
Truth in Lending Act as an example of public interest legislation.
(Whether it is one we need not decide.) A question arises that the
statute leaves obscure, say, whether the lender must disclose its
retention of "unearned" insurance premiums that are not rebated
on early repayment of the principal.' Does the statute require this
disclosure? This turns quickly enough into the question: Is more
disclosure better?
Knowing that the statute is "pro-disclosure" won't help you
answer that question. The existence of a "value" of disclosure
does not say how much Congress thought it wise to sacrifice in
pursuit of that value. By specifying what was to be disclosed, Congress may well have thought it already had come right up to the
point at which the costs of disclosure, including those created by
cluttered disclosure documents that baffle more than they enlighten, outweighed the benefits of more disclosure. When a document specifies a means to attain the ends the drafters had in sight,
2
it contains its own limiting principle - if only we can locate it.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION

The problem put in focus by these five considerations is that
statutes and constitutions are unlikely to contain "answers" to the
problems courts find hard. Words are tricky to start with; words in
legal documents are worse.
Take a law requiring the leashing of dogs. Does it also cover cats
(because it really covers animals), wolves (canines), or lions
I See Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205 (1981).
2 Because documents describing the means to pursue ends - instead of just specifying
ends -

have built-in limits, Michael Perry is wrong in believing that he can distinguish

"extra-constitutional" from "contra-constitutional" decisions by judges. See Perry, JudicialActivism, 7 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Perry, JudicialActivism] and M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS ix, 17-36

(1982). Perry says that courts may pursue to undefined extents, any value they find in the
Constitution. He seems to assume that the drafters of the Constitution had never heard of

too much of a good thing. That's not very likely, and the whole structure of the Constitution implies that the rights specified there were limited because the creation and

maintenance of rights is very costly.
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(dangerous animals)? A court will find these questions were not
present in the minds of the legislators, who might have chosen any
of these had they thought about it. Similarly, take something that

looks very clear indeed, the requirement that the President be
thirty-five years old. Does thirty-five denote a number of revolu-

tions of the Earth around the Sun, or was it designed as a percentage of the average life span (so today the President must be forty-

five)? Or could the language conceivably denote some number of
years after puberty (so today one could be President at thirty)?
Each is supported by a constellation of plausible "values." The

forty-five year interpretation would ensure that the President is
relatively mature and respected compared with others in government; the thirty year rule would allow a gifted person to serve after
passing a set of number of years in "adult society," where he or

she learned the necessary skills to carry out the job. Indeed, almost
any interesting interpretation of old language will have the support

of some plausible constellation of "values."
This may appear to be an absurd example, but it is not. Other
parts of the Constitution are as clear in the abstract as the thirtyfive year rule, yet their meaning has been blurred in the process of
interpretation because of difficulty in ascertaining the ends the

words were designed to serve. 3 One cannot say that "thirty-five" is
"clear" without invoking some community of understanding,
which in turn depends on agreement about what function the
3 For example, the provision that "No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts" (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1) has been treated as if it were immediately followed by "unless there is a good reason for doing so." See Home Building &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). The requirement that "Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be
necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the
United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him" or vetoed
and overridden (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3), has been construed not to require presentation of constitutional amendments to the President, even though no amendment may be
sent to the states except by concurrence of the Senate and House. Hollingsworth v.
Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798), a case subsequently described as creating an "exception [sic!] to the Presentment Clauses." INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2786 n.20 (1983).
The first amendment, which says that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech," has been taken - even by Hugo Black, that most literal of Justices as if it read "No part of the government shall do anything ... abridging the freedom of
speech." Black parted ways from his colleagues only because he refused to go along with
their addition of "unless, on balance, the circumstances warrant the abridgement" to this
reworded clause. The fifth amendment, which contains a due process clause but no equal
protection clause, has been read as identical in meaning to the fourteenth amendment,
which contains both. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). A Court capable of going in
the teeth of language of this sort would not find the age limitation for the President much
of a hurdle.
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denotation serves. To invoke a plain meaning rule is to beg the
central question of meaning, to sweep under the rug, to hide, the
means by which meaning is established. This may be why resting
on the "plain meaning" is so popular as a method of construction;
it relieves judges of the burden of justification.
Yet without a settled way of deriving meaning for an enactment,
meaning lies in the selection of a rule. The rule selection process is
discretionary. Discretion belongs to judges. And discretion is
power, which most people like having.
Thus, it is no surprise that the rules of statutory construction are
a total jumble. Karl Llewellyn listed them in The Common Law
Tradition. Playing the role of a legal Isaac Newton, he showed
that for every rule there is an equal and opposite rule.' Statutes in
derogation of the common law are strictly construed, but remedial
statutes are liberally construed. It turns out that every remedial
statute is in derogation of the common law, so the judge has discretion aplenty.
Attempts to resolve the jumble have not been successful. They
never will be, for one consequence of the Court's status as a collective body reaching decisions by majority vote is that it is bound to
produce conflicting decisions. The theory of public choice tells us
that when a body with more than two members has more than two
choices, it cannot exclude the possibility of self-contradiction. The
more decisions and members there are, the more likely contradictions become. I therefore do not blame the Court for having so
many approaches to interpretation. The concern here, rather, is
with the possibility that none of the approaches is very desirable.
Think for a moment about the rules that enable a court to get
away from the vagaries of the canons. The "plain meaning" rule is
plainly ridiculous, for reasons that should be plain by now. The
"clear statement" approach, a universal strict construction rule
that is a cousin to the plain meaning rule, fails because it is invoked
at random, when a judge is "surprised" by a result, rather than
uniformly.' And uniform application of a clear statement rule
4 K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITIoN 521-35 (1960).
5 Last year the Court invoked the "clear statement" approach when it was surprised
that Congress had made an amendment to the bankruptcy laws effective retroactively.
United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982). There was only a little
problem: the statute was as clearly written as it possibly could have been. The "construction" the Court gave it was a backhanded way of invalidating the law to avoid facing a constitutional question. Why the Court thinks it is entitled to avoid constitutional questions by
doing the opposite of what Congress said has never been made "clear".
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wouldn't work either, because often the legislature wants to enact
a principle rather than a code of rules. The Sherman Act is a good
example of a statutory principle, free trade, which the courts must
flesh out.
The clear statement rule thus cannot guide judicial decision
making. A different method is to think oneself into the minds of
the enacting legislators and imagine how they would have decided.
Great judges, from Hand and Frankfurter to several now sitting,
have adopted one or another variant of this approach. Yet the
method asks the impossible when the plaintiff invokes one statute
and the defendant another, from a different legislature. Into
whose minds must the judge delve? The legislators may well have
answered the questions differently. Which group controls? ("The
latter group" is an easy but wrong answer; the maxim "repeals by
implication are not favored" honors the work of the first group
and is based on a belief that legislatures neither try nor can be expected to tidy up all of the work of earlier sessions.)
The method of imagining how legislators would have answered
questions that never occurred to them is questionable for another
reason, this one quite fundamental: it calls on judges to override
the procedural, coalition building, want of time, and veto constraints on the legislative process, treating them as mere falderal.
By moving directly from presumed intent to legal rule, the court
bypasses these constraints.
Ultimately this approach fails because no one can do what it requires. How many judges could think themselves into the minds of
members of Congress sitting in 1871 and 1929, or know what
clauses capable of enactment in 1930 were out of the question in
1931 because of subtle changes? We know that there are such
changes; look at the differences over a period of six months in today's Congress. What we know about the current Congress applies
to earlier ones too.
The judge's role must be limited to protect against wilful judges
who lack self-restraint and to protect the principle that private
order prevails unless clearly displaced. But this is not enough.
Even the most humble judge will fail if given a charge to recreate in
his own mind the 535 minds that contemplated yesterday's problems and to continue legislating on their platforms. Even the best
judge will find that the imagined dialogues of deceased legislators
have much in common with today's judges' conceptions of the
good.
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Where does this leave us? My principal argument is that there is
no satisfactory solution to the problem with which I began - that
meaning lies with the reader rather than the writer - so long as we
assume that readers should read and interpret. But why must this
be so? The act of interpretation assumes that for any given dispute, there is some law, and it only remains for the judge to pronounce that law. What happens if we entertain the thought that on
some questions there is no law?6 The judge, having picked up the
statute or constitutional provision, puts it down again.
The usual assumption of parties and judges in litigation is that
Congress or the Framers of the Constitution have solved, or authorized judges to solve, all questions that arise later on. Surely
this is nothing but a conceit. Congress has not begun to think of all
questions; it could not yet have supplied all answers. And in a
generally (classical) liberal society, Congress would not confess to
having supplied rules of decision for all disputes. Some things remain in the private domain.
If judges are to say: "We have no answer to this dispute," on
what grounds do they do so? They could invoke a presumption
against legal regulation, but this would be hard to justify. Perhaps
Congress has established pervasive rules for some whole classes of
disputes. It seems preferable to do for statutes what we do for contracts: create a set of background understandings that enable the
parties to reach agreements and communicate their meanings with
maximum facility.
Such a rule for statutes might be the following: if a legislature
authorizes the creation of a common law, then judges may supply
rules in hard cases, but according to their lights rather than those
of the enacting Congress. In such a case, the rule carries out the
legislative plan, even if it is not the rule Congress would have
selected. The Sherman Act is an example, the National Labor Relations Act (delegating to the NLRB rather than the courts) is another. The transfer of responsibility for decision must be clear, else
it is hard to find assent by both legislature and executive. When the

6 To many other questions there are answers - right answers. Often people agree on
meaning; text and history supply guides. I do not for a second suppose that law is mush.
Most questions have answers, which can be supplied without resort to politics. As I emphasized at the beginning, however, it is not my purpose to review the easy cases, which can be
resolved without appellate litigation. The analysis here takes up the questions of interpretation on which reasonable people disagree.
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transfer occurs, however, courts have ample justification for proceeding.
When, on the other hand, the statute appears to establish rules
in the name of the enacting legislature, then the presumption must
be one of compromise and consequent judicial passivity. Judicial
interpretation that supplies more rules, even those that advance
the same set of values that informed the statute, upsets the compromise and also allows the legislature to live after its term. This is
objectionable if it means more laws without the usual procedures
and possibility of veto, objectionable too if it means judges implementing their own ideas of the good but palming them off as
the ideas of others and thus avoiding responsibility.
III.

THE PROBLEM OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

There is a problem underlying all of the issues raised above. It is
the problem of legitimate authority. The usual debate about what
judges do or should do starts with an argument by one disputant
that we live in a representative democracy, that democracy means
that only the elected (responsible) officials should make important
decisions, and that judges, who are not elected and who possess
tenure to make them not answerable for their decisions, therefore
should not make important choices. This is especially so, the argument concludes, for constitutional choices, because the elected
representatives cannot override the judges' decisions.
The arguments in reply come from a number of traditions. One
tradition emphasizes the "imperfections" of representative democracy; because the "real" will of the people does not get carried
out by the legislatures, and because judges may have a comparative advantage over legislatures in making some kinds of decisions (those involving fundamental values, for example), we
should entrust these decisions to judges. Another kind of response
emphasizes that the Framers gave us a document that limits the
scope of representative democracy, and that judges, implementing
fundamental principles of the republic, are part of the limit.
Both of these lines of argument can be forced, with only a little
violence, 7 into the "perfect constitution" mold, which has the
following syllogism: (1) The Constitution (or statute) requires
7 Of course no one will admit to supporting the syllogism in such a bald form, and I do
not offer it as a representation of any one person's views. I resort to this reduction of
serious arguments only in order to avoid making this essay tedious.
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what is wise, just, and good. (2) Judges are authorized to interpret
the Constitution (or statute), and their decisions are binding on the
other branches of government. (3) Policy P is wise, just, and good
[here insert whatever policy is being disputed]. Therefore (4) A
judge properly may order other branches of government, or
private parties, to follow policy P. Corollary: Any judge who, for
whatever reason, will not order P to be carried out, must be disagreeing with the desirability of that policy (premise (3)). If, by the
same premise, policy P is good, the judge must be bad.
Those who doubt the wisdom or propriety of judges' possessing
expansive powers usually engage by denying premise (1) or premise
(3). Premise (2) seems to have been settled since John Marshall.'
Over and over the Court says, to an acquiescing audience, that it
has the power to declare what the law is, and others, including the
President, must hop to it. 9 But what happens if on some subjects
there is no law at all to apply - or at least if "the law" is not some
rule firmly grounded in a decision by people authorized to act but
is created by a process of perilous inferences? When the status of
"the law" is open to question, so is premise (2).
Let me turn the question around for a moment. Why do we
obey judges, as premise (2) says we must? The argument Chief Justice Marshall gave in Marbury v. Madison was not an argument
for judicial supremacy. Marshall never claimed for judges any superior wisdom or comparative advantage in deciding constitutional or other questions, and he did not argue that people owe
allegiance to judges. The Court said in Marbury, rather, that certain decisions had been made long ago. The Framers decided what
the scope of the Court's original jurisdiction was to be; the Court
could ascertain what the limit was; and faced with a conflict between Constitution and statute, the Court had to follow the Constitution. The Justices had taken an oath that (like the Supremacy
Clause) put the Constitution first. The Court imposed no duties on
outsiders, and by its rationale it had no right to do so. Quite the
contrary, on the reasoning of Marbury every other officer of
government has the same duty of responsible reasoning as every
Justice. The oath and Supremacy Clause place the Constitution
over the decision of a coordinate branch. Thus the Court could

8 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958).

9 E.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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disregard what Congress said. Then the President, by the same
process of reasoning, could disregard what the Court said, if he
thought the Court mistaken. Whichever governmental official had
the last word on a subject, given the nature of the dispute, would
make the constitutional judgment.' 0
This last-responsible-official approach seems to leave rights up
in the air. No one would have the power to give definitive views.
Some have thought the need for definitive answers to be a sufficient reason for allowing courts to have the last word. I'm not so
sure of this. First, because courts fall prey to self-contradiction,
they cannot offer definitive answers for many legal problems. Second, the observation that the ability of the President to disregard
the Court (when the allocation of powers in Articles I and II gives
the President the last word) gives the President a constitutional
bazooka, an unchecked power foreign to our governmental structure, proves too much by far. The Constitution is full of doomsday
weapons, disused largely because of their potency. The Congress
can strip the executive branch of employees and cut off the President's funds if it wants; there is real power for you. We do not try
to make it go away just because it is overarching. The principal
control is not denying that the power exists but that all power has a
price under the Constitution, and the President has weapons of his
own. A power in the executive to say "No" to some judicial decisions is no more destructive than the judicial power to say "No"
to Congress or the legislative power to say "No" to the President.
Not until long after Marbury did the Court begin to say that its
power of interpretation excluded the exercise of similar powers by
other branches. Not until 1958, in Cooper v. Aaron," did the
Court explicitly say that the Constitution confided the ultimate
powers of interpretation exclusively to judges, and the statement
in Cooper was dictum because that case involved the application
of the Supremacy Clause to the states rather than allocation of authority among branches of the national government. The Court
implicitly had taken the Cooper position long before Cooper,
however; the Court's position just confirmed what had been practice for a long, long time. The power of judges to have the last
word on the meaning of statutes and constitutions has carried the
10 Learned Hand attributes this view to Jefferson, but the presentation seems to have
more of Hand than of Jefferson in it. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTs 3-30 (1958).
11 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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day only in the court of history, not in the court of logic. It has
proven a (generally) satisfactory way to allocate functions in a very
complex government. It is by no means necessary - most other
civilized societies exist quite well without anything like it - but it
has been useful.
But the transmutation of the nature of judicial review from a
power to guide one's own conduct by one's best lights into a power
to dictate how others shall behave has some implications for the
quality of the justifications that a judge must supply. A judge cannot expect obedience just because he announces what he thinks a
wise and just result would be. He must always be prepared to give
an answer to the question: Why should other people pay attention? Why is the opinion any more binding than a law review article?
The reason the judge gives about why obedience must be forthcoming usually will take the form of asserting that someone other
than the judge really decided the issue. The question was settled by
the Framers of the Constitution or the drafters of a statute. There
is a rule, binding on judges and others alike, to which all must conform. The judge's authority to compel obedience comes from that
external decision, not from the judge's own desires.
This is not to say that judges must "find" rather than "make"
law. Finding versus making is a false dichotomy. All interpretation
involves meaning added by the reader. The point of this discussion
is that the more meaning added by the judge, the less powerful the
judge's claim to obedience.
When a judge issues a ruling under the authorization of a statute
or proviso entitling a judge to invent a common law on the subject
(antitrust law and the "reasonableness" clause of the fourth
amendment are again good examples), the court's claim to obedience is as strong as if the judge were enforcing a "plain" statute.
The judge can point to an external rule of calling for obedience in one case to the "plain" rule, in the other to whatever rule the
judge makes up using the grant of law-making authority. The
judge's claim is at least as good as Congress's claim to be obeyed in
executing power under the Commerce Clause.
When a court's claim to obedience is based on its belief that it is
doing what legislators would have wanted had they thought about
the subject, it is on much weaker ground. If the legislators did not
settle some issue and did not authorize courts to fill in the blanks,
why should anyone listen to what the judge says? The judge's
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claim to obedience is little better than that of a professor of law.
Similarly, a judge who claims power to make decisions based on a
noninterpretive approach to the Constitution is bold indeed. Why
should people obey if all the judge can say in support of the decision is that (a) the decision lays down a good rule, and (b) the deciit is not starkly
sion is not "contraconstitutional" in the sense that
2
Framers?'
the
of
decision
actual
an
to
contrary
My point is simple, although often missed. Both judges and the
overwhelming majority of scholars who write on constitutional
and statutory interpretation assume that vague statutes and constitutions lift the fetters that bind courts. If history and language
do not supply a certain meaning for a text, the argument goes,
then judges are entitled to supply meanings, and they should
choose the meaning that best accords with wise and just government. Because words often lack definite meanings, because the
Constitution and many statutes were drafted a very long time ago,
and often neither language nor history meshes well with current
problems, these people conclude that judges have substantial
discretion over almost every dispute.' 3
The premise may be true. Words often do not have fixed meanings. I have tried to give a number of reasons why statutes and
constitutions are bound to speak poorly or not at all to essential
questions. But the conclusion does not follow. It confuses legal
with literary interpretation. The ambulatory nature of statutes
means that judges have less power, not more. The more we doubt
the power of words to convey meaning, the more we must doubt
the authority of judges to coerce compliance with their conclusions, and the more modest judges must be about their demands.
This is a mere sketch of a position. It is possible to state 14a
number of objections (as Richard Epstein does in the next paper).
But this is a field in which all positions are untenable. Insoluble

12 This seems to be Professor Perry's position, and many others take a similar stand on
the bredth of judicial power (although not necessarily on its sources). See Perry, Judicial
Activism, supra note 3, at 72-73.
13 For just a few of the many arguments along such lines, see G. CALABR si, A COMMON
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); Perry, JudicialActivism, supra note 3; Brest, The
Misconceived Questfor the OriginalUnderstanding,60 B.U. L. REv. 204 (1980); Dworkin,
The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469 (1981); Levinson, Law as Literature, 60
TEx. L. REv. 373 (1982); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,96 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1983). These arguments use very
different routes to their conclusions, but the conclusions are similar.
14 Epstein, The Pitfallsof Interpretation,7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101 (1984).
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problems do not lead to neat answers. Whatever one makes of the
suggestion that judges be more willing to put statutes back down,
read but unconstrued, our objective must be to establish a consistent and principled set of rules for legal interpretation, so that
drafters have a set of norms to use in communicating. That we are
farther from this objective two hundred years into the republic
than at its beginning may mean that it is a Sisyphean task, but the
task is too vital for us to admit this, even to ourselves.
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